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UP IN ARMS: THE HUNT TO DEFINE THE SECOND
AMENDMENT’S SCOPE
I. FIRST SHOT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. The Sporting Life: Hunting and the Second Amendment
As hunting technology advances at a rapid pace, sport hunting
moves leaps and bounds beyond its modest origins.1  With these
innovations, the advent of smart rifles, drones, and other features
raise questions concerning the ethics of hunting and Second
Amendment applicability.2  Courts have yet to define the scope of
the Second Amendment.3  However, a Pennsylvania district court
1. See Dan Seufert, Using Drones as Hunting Tool to Track Wildlife at Issue, UNION
LEADER (Jan. 17, 2015, 5:20 PM), http://www.unionleader.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ar-
ticle?AID=/20150118/NEWS0621/150119167/0/sport04 (discussing New Hamp-
shire’s proposed smart rifle ban).  Fish and Game law enforcement representatives
expressed that using drones and smart rifles for hunting is neither appropriate nor
ethical.  Traditional hunting revolves around the principle of fair chase and a bal-
ance between human technology and environmental preservation.  Advances in
hunting technology enable seemingly unerring accuracy in hunting, which raises
ethical questions about the direction in which the sport is heading.  Proponents
for restriction on the use of weapons such as smart rifles argue that the technology
violates the moral tenets of hunting.  This sentiment impacts legislative and judi-
cial treatment of the use of such technology as it gains popularity among hunters.
See id.
2. See Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms 89 IND. L. REV.
1587, 1624 (2014) (noting debate on applicability of Second Amendment to par-
ticular types of firearms).  Smart rifles include several improvements upon tradi-
tional hunting firearms.  Targets increase human safety by ensuring that only
authorized users may fire the weapon.  The same technology may be used to en-
sure that holders may only fire at inanimate targets.  However, these advances also
enable hunters to shoot with unfailing accuracy when combined with other fea-
tures. See Joseph Steinberg, Why You Should Be Concerned About the New ‘Smart Guns’
(Whether You Love or Hate Guns), FORBES (May 4, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2014/05/04/smartguns/ (describing smart gun tech-
nology).  Opponents of smart rifle technology argue that it inherently precludes
fairness of the hunt, a central component of traditional hunting. See Rick Ganley
& Michael Brindley, Tradition v. Technology: The Debate Over Drones, Smart Rifles in
Hunting, N.H. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29, 2015), http://nhpr.org/post/tradition-vs-tech-
nology-debate-over-drones-smart-rifles-hunting (discussing proposed regulation’s
relationship to ethics of hunting and fair chase principle).
3. See Michael P. O’Shea, The Second Amendment Wild Card: The Persisting Rele-
vance of the “Hybrid” Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REV.
597, 598 (2013) (outlining Second Amendment application in recent cases).  The
Second Amendment’s focus is on the individual right of a law-abiding citizen to
keep firearms in the home for personal protection.  However, courts have yet to
definitively outline the scope of Second Amendment protected conduct, leaving it
to future courts to determine what firearm conduct legislation may regulate with-
out impinging upon a constitutional right. See id.
(255)
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recently dismissed a hunting advocacy group’s Second Amendment
claim, finding hunting outside the realm of constitutional protec-
tion offered by the Second Amendment.4
Hunting advocates argue that the right to bear arms includes
hunting.5  Firearm possession is generally thought of as a “penum-
bral” right to the foundation of the Second Amendment.6  Even
strict Second Amendment interpretations have expanded to in-
clude rights to self-defense unrelated to the military.7  Cases have
yet to define a clear outer limit to the Second Amendment.8  Ad-
vances in hunting technology further complicate the issue, as
equipment features arguably lessen the need for human skill, which
may further remove hunting technology from original Second
Amendment-protected equipment.9  Recent cases have addressed
gun possession rights and hunting rights without providing defini-
tive answers.10
4. See Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pennsylvania Game Comm’n, 28
F. Supp. 3d 340 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (finding no Second Amendment protection for
hunters).
5. See O’Shea, supra note 3, at 617–18 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008)) (describing hybrid interpretation of Second Amendment
rights). District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), expanded on an ambigu-
ous constitutional right to self-defense to build upon a more solid conception of
Second Amendment rights.  It expanded upon related constitutional case law to
establish a secure right to self-defense in the Second Amendment. In ruling as
such, “even courts that viewed self-defense as merely an auxiliary, penumbral as-
pect of the Second Amendment would still likely strike those restrictions down.”
See O’Shea, supra note 3, at 617–18.
6. See O’Shea, supra note 3, at 617–18 (describing hybrid interpretation of
Second Amendment rights).
7. See id. (rejecting originalist Second Amendment interpretation). Heller
avoided prior case law’s focus on the Second Amendment’s military origins.  The
Court focused on the individual right to bear arms rather than precedent’s focus
on the right to bear arms as a civil and political right. See id.
8. See id. at 598 (describing expansion of Second Amendment interpretation).
While the Second Amendment explicitly addresses the right to bear arms in the
military realm, it likely covers other traditional legal uses of firearms such as hunt-
ing. See id.
9. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See Leider, supra note 2, at 1624
(describing judicial approach to firearms in post-Civil War era).  While the Second
Amendment addresses a military need to bear arms, it is not an explicitly exhaus-
tive list of protected uses of firearms.  A Second Amendment interpretation fo-
cused on the individual right rather than political need supports the argument
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right unrelated to military pur-
poses.  Applying the Second Amendment to such an individual right rather than a
military right would render legislation seeking to curb the right to bear arms un-
constitutional. See id.
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing New Hampshire’s pro-
posed smart rifle ban).
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Hunting combines weaponry, survival skills, ethics, and tech-
nology.11  Hunters argue for an inclusive interpretation of the Sec-
ond Amendment.12  In doing so, hunters conceptualize a
constitutional right to bear arms beyond basic self-defense.13  How-
ever, tensions strain between an asserted basic American freedom
and a country struggling with constant tragedies brought by gun
violence.14  What should be unfathomable has become routine in a
country slowly numbed by violence.15  This conflict has necessitated
a close examination of the Second Amendment in recent years.16
In evaluating constitutional bases, case precedent, and societal
needs, it seems reasonable that a right to recreationally hunt falls
far outside the scope of Second Amendment protection.17
This comment considers the probability that courts will extend
Second Amendment rights to hunters.  Section II of this comment
explores Second Amendment analytical framework throughout his-
tory, followed by an overview of societal views on firearms and the
right to bear arms from Second Amendment’s enactment in 1791
11. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing essence of hunting).
12. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 572 (2008) (discussing
self-defense aspect of Second Amendment); see also Thomas Moncure, Jr., The Sec-
ond Amendment Ain’t About Hunting, 34 HOW. L.J. 589 (analyzing Second Amend-
ment original intent and expansion of definition for modern times).  Rapid
advances in hunting technology raise questions of whether such changes remove
current hunting firearms from the realm of the Second Amendment altogether.
The Second Amendment sought to ensure a right to bear arms aimed at enabling
the United States to protect itself.  This foundation suggests that the Second
Amendment’s scope is tied to military purposes rather than a right ensuring fire-
arm possession for individual citizens.  The Second Amendment explicitly contex-
tualizes the right to bear arms for military purposes.  Nothing in the text suggests
an intent to include the rights of citizens in a non-military capacity. See Moncure,
supra.
13. See Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pennsylvania Game Comm’n,
28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 340–41 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (presenting alleged Constitutional
right to bear arms in hunting context).
14. See id. (presenting alleged Constitutional right to bear arms in hunting
context); see also Sabrina Siddiqui, Almost 100 School Shootings Have Occurred Since
Newtown While Congress Has Done Nothing, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2014, 7:00
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/09/school-shootings-new-
town_n_6292052.html (noting consistent occurrence of gun violence in schools in
years following Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting).
15. See Gardiner Harris & Michael D. Shear, Obama Condemns ‘Routine’ of Mass
Shootings, Says U.S. Has Become Numb, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/10/02/us/obama-oregon-shooting-umpqua-community-college-
gun-control.html?_r=0 (noting President Obama’s response to most recent public
shootings and nation’s apparent complacency).
16. See Moncure, supra note 12, at 597 (analyzing Second Amendment origi-
nal definition application in modern times).  The Second Amendment secures an
individual liberty unrelated to a right to hunt. See id.
17. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340–41 (denying Second Amendment pro-
tection for hunters).
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through today.  Section III of this comment chronicles the techno-
logical progression of firearms throughout the same time range.
Section IV of this comment provides an overview of recent Second
Amendment cases, and applies these standards to a hypothetical
suit brought against the New Hampshire state legislature for its pro-
posed regulation.  Finally, Section V of this comment provides an
overview for the future of Second Amendment claims in the realm
of hunting.
Courts have yet to announce a definite level of scrutiny for Sec-
ond Amendment claims.  New Hampshire’s ban on a particular
breed of firearms adds additional layers to defining the Second
Amendment’s scope.  Bans on particular firearm technology will
likely cause courts to evaluate the constitutionality of such categori-
cal bans. Additionally, courts may eventually have to determine at
what point technology removes firearms from the Second Amend-
ment’s scope entirely. Finally, courts may choose to apply the Sec-
ond Amendment and evaluate regulations based upon the conduct
implicated: self-defense or hunting.
B. Direct Hit: How to Define the Right to Bear Arms Accurately
Gun possession is a polarizing issue in the United States, fueled
by seemingly constant accidental shootings, school shootings, and
other public massacres.18  When people blame the weapons them-
selves rather than infrastructural issues, pro-gun groups rally to af-
firm the right to bear arms.19 Several recent cases question the
18. See Mark Berman, How Often Do Children in the U.S. Unintentionally Shoot and
Kill People? We Don’t Know, WASH. POST (Sep. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/04/how-often-do-children-in-the-u-s-unin-
tentionally-shoot-and-kill-people-we-dont-know/ (noting prevalent media coverage
of gun-related incidents but lack of concrete data).
A three-year-old boy is playing with a gun and shoots himself in the face.
A four-year-old girl discovers a gun and shoots her four-year-old cousin,
killing him.  A three-year-old boy shoots himself in the head. A five-year-
old accidentally shoots a three-year-old girl.  A five-year-old boy acciden-
tally shoots and kills himself.  A four-year-old boy accidentally shoots him-
self. A two-year-old boy shoots and kills his eleven-year-old sister.  It goes
on like this, story after story of unintentional shootings involving children
that lead to injuries or deaths.
See id. Regardless of national focus on gun violence in the wake of Sandy Hook,
the country later witnessed an additional forty-five fatal and seventy-eight non-fatal
shootings. See Siddiqui, supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing perva-
sive gun violence in America).
19. See Jackie Kucinich, Can Mental Health Care Reform Help Stop Mass Killings,
WASH. POST (June 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/
wp/2014/06/03/can-mental-health-care-reform-help-stop-mass-killings/ (discuss-
ing relationship between mental health and gun violence in United States).  Gun
possession advocates argue that laws seeking to curb gun use and ownership im-
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outer bounds of the Second Amendment, particularly the alleged
rights of hunters.20
Courts have distinguished the right to bear arms from the right
to hunt.21  The Second Amendment at its “core” protects the right
to defend oneself.22  Numerous cases repeat this principal.23  A con-
stitutional right to hunt is far hazier.24  In recent years cases have
distinguished firearm possession from hunting.25  In doing so,
courts tend to reject the notion that Second Amendment extends
to hunting.26  Consequently, hunting laws face a different level of
scrutiny than the strict scrutiny applied to firearms possession cases,
rendering prohibitive statutes more likely to be upheld.27
II. MUSKETS TO SMART RIFLES—SECOND AMENDMENT TREATMENT
THROUGHOUT HISTORY
A. Second Amendment Interpretation
Defining and asserting constitutional rights necessitates
pinge upon an individual right secured by the Second Amendment.  Additionally,
they argue that all gun control laws are pointless, merely furthering a liberal
agenda without enhancing safety for American citizens. See NRA Files Lawsuits to
Protect Second Amendment Rights in Pennsylvania, NRA INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
(Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20150114/nra-files-lawsuits-to-pro
tect-2nd-amendment-rights-in-pennsylvania (discussing NRA’s suit for alleged in-
fringement upon Second Amendment rights).
20. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340–41 (denying Second Amendment pro-
tection for hunters).
21. See id. (denying Second Amendment protection for hunters).
22. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting
fundamental core to Second Amendment protection).  The Second Amendment
does not preclude a legislature from categorically banning possession of handguns
without serial numbers.  Such a categorical restriction thus fails to violate a right
secured by the Second Amendment and fails to violate the central holding of Hel-
ler.  The fundamental right recognized by Heller encompassed a right to bear arms
for the purposes of protecting an individual’s person and home. See id.
23. See, e.g., Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340–41 (denying Second Amendment
protection for hunters).
24. See id. (noting lack of authority for Second Amendment extension to
hunting).  “Plaintiffs acknowledge that no legal precedent establishes a constitu-
tional right to hunt, but argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decision[s] re-
present persuasive authority that the Second Amendment has been extended to
embrace the right to hunt.” See id.
25. See id. (noting lack of authority for Second Amendment extension to
hunting).
26. See id. (noting lack of authority for Second Amendment extension to
hunting).
27. See id. (denying Second Amendment protection for hunters).
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interpretation.28 Constitutional interpretation shifts with society.29
Extension of the right to bear arms raises ethical and public safety
issues.30  As technology removes human skill from hunting,31 it calls
into question the human right to engage in hunting.32
The Second Amendment refers to the purpose behind the con-
stitutional safeguard before identifying the right.33  In turn, “the
purpose of the right to keep and bear arms informs the content of
that right.”34  The Fourteenth Amendment encapsulates the Sec-
ond Amendment right to possess firearms for self-defensive pur-
poses.35  Technology, particularly that associated with weaponry,
raises constitutional interpretation issues.36
The word “arms,” in the context of the Constitution of the
United States, refers to the arms of a militiaman or sol-
dier, and the word is used in its military sense;?the arms of
the infantry soldier are the musket and bayonet;?of cavalry
and dragoons, the sabre, holster pistols, and carbine;?of
the artillery, the field piece, siege gun, and mortar, with
side arms.37
28. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 742 (2010) (consider-
ing whether Second Amendment applies to individual states as well as federal
government).
29. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also James G. Wilson, The Role
of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 BYU L. REV. 1037, 1038–39 (1993)
(considering public opinion’s impact on judicial interpretation).
30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting ethical concern with use
of smart rifles).
31. See id. (noting ethical concern with use of smart rifles).
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (securing right to bear arms for United States
citizens).
33. See id. (securing right to bear arms for United States citizens).  “A well-
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” See id. The right to bear
arms is the “constitutional right of a person to own firearms.” BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1522 (9th ed. 2009) (defining Right to Bear Arms).
34. See Leider, supra note 2, at 1614 (describing judicial approach to Second
Amendment interpretation).
35. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 742 (2010) (synthesiz-
ing Heller’s central holding).
36. See Moncure, supra note 12, at 597 (analyzing Second Amendment origi-
nal intent).
37. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871) (providing narrow interpretation
of right to bear arms in alleged Second Amendment violation claim).  A narrow
interpretation of the Second Amendment limits its scope to firearm possession
only in the context of war and protection of a nation against the threat of tyranny.
The right does not extend beyond military purposes to an individual right to pro-
tect oneself against other citizens.  Additionally, this narrow interpretation would
limit possession to military-grade firearms for use strictly in military context. See id.
6
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Defining this alleged right requires defining the piece of
equipment itself.38  “The natural meaning of ‘bear arms,’ as used in
the Second Amendment, means wear, bear, or carry upon the per-
son or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of being
armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of
conflict with another person.”39  While the Second Amendment
generally protects a fundamental right, “some categorical disqualifi-
cations are permissible.”40
While strict scrutiny generally rejects sweeping prohibitions,
“Congress is not limited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who
have been shown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these
limits be established by evidence presented in court.”41  Addition-
ally, recent cases state that “[precedent] did not suggest that dis-
qualifications would be effective only if the statute’s benefits are
first established by admissible evidence,” and “[c]ategorical limits
on the possession of firearms would not be a constitutional
anomaly.”42
Courts evaluate whether a right’s context, foundation, and his-
torical weight justify protection afforded by the Bill of Rights.43
Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pennsylvania Game Commission44
analyzed hunting and the Second Amendment, building upon Sec-
ond Amendment framework provided by District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler45 and expanded by United States v. Marzzarella46 and United States.
v. Skoien.47
38. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
39. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 675 (2008).
40. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding
firearms possession restriction).
41. See id. (upholding firearms possession restriction).
42. See id.; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (noting context’s impact on legisla-
tive interpretation).  A court cannot simply divorce a constitutional right from the
context in which the legislature enacted it.  This interpretation may preclude ex-
pansion of a right to cover conduct not initially envisioned. See Heller, 554 U.S. at
580.
43. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (providing analy-
sis for evaluation of alleged fundamental right).
44. 28 F. Supp. 3d 340 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
45. 554 U.S. 625 (2008).
46. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
47. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). See Hunters, 28 F.
Supp. 3d at 345 (providing Second Amendment challenge framework).  A Court
first considers whether a law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amend-
ment.  The inquiry ends if the conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s in-
tended scope.  If the conduct is protected, the court evaluates the law under “some
form of means-end scrutiny.”  In making this consideration, the court compares
the law’s purpose and means of accomplishing the purpose.  If the court considers
the means and end somewhat proportional, the law is constitutional.  If the two
7
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In considering whether the law protects certain conduct, the
court makes several considerations.48  First, the court classifies the
conduct allegedly infringed.49  Next, the court considers whether
the constitution protects the conduct.50  Finally, the court deter-
mines if the conduct in question falls within the realm of protection
offered by the Constitution.51  Similar to the First Amendment, the
Second Amendment does not offer unchecked protection.52  In
other words, exceptions exist to the constitutionally secured rights
conferred by the amendment.53
While recent cases acknowledge the “unsettled” nature of Sec-
ond Amendment’s “scope,” recent Second Amendment suits “un-
derscore[ ] that the ‘core’ of the Second Amendment is the right of
‘law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth
and home.’”54  A “core” implies uncertain Second Amendment
bounds, and that the right to bear arms exists with limitations.55
The recreational sport of hunting has not been recog-
nized as a constitutionally protected liberty or property in-
terest by state or federal law.  Unlike a license to pursue a
livelihood or engage in a profession, which has been held
to be a property right protected by Article I, Section 1 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, no cases have held that
provisions of the federal or state constitutions establish or
lack congruence, then the law is unconstitutional. Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345;
see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 638.
48. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (providing Second Amendment chal-
lenge framework).
49. See id. (providing Second Amendment challenge framework).
50. See id. (providing Second Amendment challenge framework).
51. See id. (providing Second Amendment challenge framework).
52. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641 (noting permissibility of statutory categorical
distinctions).  The Second Amendment allows for some categorical restrictions on
firearms possession.  This reflects well-established First Amendment precedent.
For example, courts recognize a number of exceptions to the constitutionally en-
sured right to freedom of speech.  Courts uphold categorical exceptions to obscen-
ity, defamation, and incitement among others.  As exceptions, the First
Amendment offers no constitutional protection to these categories as means of
expression. See id. The Second Amendment is not without limitation. Specifically,
the Court stated that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibition on the possession of firearms.” See District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 625 (2008) (noting permissibility of firearm restrictions).
53. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (noting permissibility of firearm restrictions).
54. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (upholding statutory restriction on
hunting).
55. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 572 (noting both core and limitations to core of
Second Amendment protection).
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protect a right to hunt or trap or the right to engage in a
particular sport.56
In examining a constitutional case, courts first look to the sup-
posed classification, identifying it as suspect, or quasi-suspect, or an
alleged fundamental right.57  Courts have found fundamental
rights to include voting, privacy, and interstate travel.58  This identi-
fication dictates the court’s evaluation of the legislation, using the
rational-basis test, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.59  The
56. See Pennsylvania Game Comm’n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa. 1995)
(citations omitted) (finding revocation of hunting licenses not Due Process viola-
tion).  “All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (outlining natural rights of
Pennsylvania citizens).  “The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historical and esthetic values of the environ-
ment.  Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the
people, including generations yet to come.  As trustees of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all people.”
Id. art. I, § 27 (outlining environmental rights of Pennsylvania citizens).
57. A suspect classification is “[a] statutory classification based on race, na-
tional origin, or alienage, and thereby subject to strict scrutiny under equal-protec-
tion analysis.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1675 (9th ed. 2009).  A quasi-suspect
classification is “[a] statutory classification based on gender or legitimacy, and
therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny under equal-protection analysis.” Id.  A
fundamental right is “[a] right derived from natural or fundamental law.  A signifi-
cant component of liberty, encroachments of which are rigorously tested by courts
to ascertain the soundness of purported governmental justifications.  A fundamen-
tal right triggers strict scrutiny to determine whether the law violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”  Id.
at 378. A constitutional right is “a right guaranteed by a constitution; esp[ecially]
one guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or a state constitution.”  Id.  A fundamen-
tal constitutional right is “a right that is specifically identified in a constitution or
has been found to be protected under the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clause.” Id.
58. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (finding right to interstate
travel fundamental right); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
667 (1966) (finding poll tax violation of fundamental right to vote); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (striking down statute prohibiting particular sex-
ual behavior on grounds of violation of constitutionally assured right to privacy).
59. The rational basis test is,
[t]he criterion for judicial analysis of a statute that does not implicate a
fundamental right or a suspect or quasi-suspect classification under the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause, whereby the court will uphold a
law if it bears a reasonable relationship to the attainment of a legitimate
governmental objective.  Rational basis is the most deferential of the stan-
dards of review that courts use in due-process and equal-protection
analysis.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1453 (9th ed. 2009).  Intermediate scrutiny is “[a] stan-
dard lying between the extremes of rational-basis review and strict scrutiny.  Under
the standard, if a statute contains a quasi-suspect classification (such as gender or
legitimacy), the classification must be substantially related to the achievement of
an important governmental objective.” Id. at 938. Strict scrutiny is “[t]he standard
9
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standard impacts the likelihood a court will uphold a regulation, as
higher scrutiny exposes the regulation to a more thorough and dif-
ficult to withstand analysis.60  Courts have yet to supply definitive
classifications for hunting, leaving it to future cases.
B. Societal Attitudes On Guns and Hunting
New Hampshire’s proposed regulation is hardly the first piece
of legislation based upon morality.61  Throughout United States his-
tory, legislatures have enacted laws reflecting mainstream societal
views on moral turpitude.62  Legislatures have regulated gambling,
alcohol consumption, drug use, prostitution, sexuality, abortion,
marriage, child labor, and hunting.63  This legislation is based in
part upon moral perceptions of conduct.64  In turn, the courts eval-
applied to suspect classifications (such as race) in equal-protection analysis and to
fundamental rights (such as voting rights) in due process analysis.  Under strict
scrutiny, the state must establish that it has a compelling interest that justifies and
necessitates the law in question.” Id. at 1648.
60. See id. at 1648 (defining Strict Scrutiny).
61. See Manuel Possolo, Note, Morals Legislature After Lawrence: Can States
Criminalize the Sale of Sexual Devices?, 65 STAN. L. REV. 565, 569 (2013) (providing
background on moral legislation in America).
62. See id. (detailing morality laws in United States).
63. See Gambling Law: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INST., http://www
.law.cornell.edu/wex/gambling (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (providing overview on
gambling laws in America). See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (prohibiting alcohol in
America); 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012) (providing schedule of prohibited drugs in
America); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (upholding statute
prohibiting crossing of state lines with prostitutes on grounds of Commerce
Clause); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (striking down statute
prohibiting particular sexual behavior on grounds of violation of constitutionally
assured privacy).  Here the court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing sod-
omy, and in doing so relied upon a constitutionally assured right to privacy.  In
doing so, the Court applied an ambiguously heightened scrutiny standard, relying
on judicial power to expand clearly defined rights assured by the Constitution. See
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(noting constitutional protection of intimacy of particular personal decisions). See
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(striking down Defense of Marriage Act); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268
(1918) (upholding Congress’s power to regulate child labor under Commerce
Clause); Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pennsylvania Gaming Comm’n.,
28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 340–41 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (denying Second Amendment protec-
tion for hunters); see also Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and
Game Dep’t 312.03 (2015) (banning smart rifles).
64. See Steve Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 227, 227 (2002) (providing background on societal moral views on
behavior and corresponding impact on legislation).  “[B]oth law and morality
serve to channel our behavior.  Law accomplishes this primarily through the threat
of sanctions if we disobey legal rules.  Morality too involves incentives: bad acts may
result in guilt and disapprobation, and good acts may result in virtuous feelings
and praise.” See id.
10
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uate these laws to determine what, if any, constitutional safeguards
exist for an alleged right.65
As with New Hampshire’s proposed regulation, context regard-
ing societal attitudes during the Second Amendment’s enactment
provide some insight as to its intended scope.66  The Framers en-
acted the Second Amendment in the wake of the Revolutionary
War.67  This politically charged atmosphere undoubtedly impacted
the drafting of rights for United States citizens.68  This political con-
text shaped the Second Amendment’s intended scope, definition,
and subsequent court interpretations.69
Despite initial feelings towards firearms, the militia, and hunt-
ing, societal views shifted with time, and significant events catalyzed
changed perceptions.70  Public opinion of guns shifted notably dur-
ing two events: the Revolutionary War and the Civil War.71  Both
events stimulated production and technological advances (as dis-
cussed later) which impacted common views on the industry and its
users.72  These changes cyclically impacted and were impacted by
65. See, e.g., Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340-41 (denying Second Amendment
protection for hunters).
66. See Michael A. Bellesiles, The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States, 83 J.
AM. HIST. 425, 454 (1996) (describing political context of Second Amendment
ratification).  The Second Amendment’s enactment stemmed from political unrest
and a need to protect a young nation against the threat of war.  This protection
necessitated a constitutionally secured right of military members to possess and
bear arms. See id. The Second Amendment sought to ensure a right of American
citizens to protect their nation against the threats posed by tyranny and other na-
tions.  This right existed in a purely political and military realm. See O’Shea, supra
note 3, at 628 (describing context of Second Amendment enactment).
67. See O’Shea, supra note 3, at 615 (describing context of Second Amend-
ment enactment).  Along with the threats stemming outside the United States, the
Second Amendment sought to ensure the rights of citizens to protect democracy
against the threat of tyranny within national boundaries. See id.
68. See id. (describing second amendment intent).  The Second Amendment
was not intended to provide citizens with a right to possess firearms for use in
personal matters.  Its objective was to secure an ability to protect a nation by means
of military force in the face of invasion or tyranny.  Protection of citizens against
other citizens falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment. See id.
69. See id.; see also Leider, supra note 2, at 1588 (discussing societal viewpoint
and impact on judicial interpretation).  “In an era when many men carried weap-
ons, lawfully or not, the courts interpreted differently worded state constitutional
rights to arms so they converged around popular beliefs about the scope of the
right.”  Leider, supra note 2, at 1588.
70. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 444–46 (chronicling shifts in public percep-
tion of firearms from 1760 through 1865).
71. See id. (explaining reasons for shifting public perception).
72. See id. at 426 (noting disparity between romanticized gun prevalence in
past several hundred years in America versus reality).  Individually often errone-
ously assume that guns have always been prevalent in the United States due to
their current ubiquitous presence.  People imagine American settlers forging
paths out west “with guns in their hands and bullets on their belts.”  Reality did not
11
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Congress’s treatment of arms and the court’s interpretation of the
right to bear arms.73  A combination of national insecurity, media
portrayal, industrial advancements, and government backing paved
the way for society’s viewpoints on guns and hunting today.74  The
Civil War triggered the first major turning point.75
Public perception concerning guns in the 1800s centered
around two groups: hunters and military personnel.76  The public
considered the military largely inept, and was similarly unimpressed
by hunters.77  Nonetheless, the public generally embraced a right to
possess firearms.78  Despite this accepted right to firearm posses-
sion, hunters in the nineteenth century did not experience the
strong sense of pride and community felt throughout the nation
today.79  However, enhanced production capabilities and media
match this view, as “in the imagined past, the requirements for self-defense and
food-gathering had put firearms in the hands of nearly everyone.” See id.
73. See id. (noting staying power of gun culture).  The Second Amendment
reflected a nod to the importance of gun-ownership in a young nation.  This need
has shifted and grown into want.  The National Rifle Association seeks to defend
the individual right to firearm ownership. See id.
74. See id. at 455 (describing progression of firearm presence in United
States).  The Civil War served as a catalyst to spur firearm production and technol-
ogy improvements.  Government and industry worked in tandem for seventy years
to produce sufficient firearms.  It took an additional twenty years of active promo-
tion before American citizens began to embrace firearm possession as a necessity
for personal security.  The Civil War created the weapons demand of the Revolu-
tionary War but at a time when technology allowed for more efficient production
and weapons.  A national need for firearms for personal security during the war
transitioned to a lasting desire for firearms for personal security. See id.
75. See Leider, supra note 2, at 1620 (describing legislative shift in viewpoint
regarding firearms caused by Civil War).  The Civil War marked a shift in firearms
safety concerns.  Pre-war safety concerns “revolved primarily around concealed
weapons, dueling, and honor-related killings” while post-war concerns focused on
handgun violence. See id.
76. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 434 (describing negative public view of
militia and arms bearers).  “Public perception of the militia in the first half of the
nineteenth century tended toward the contemptuous.  Most observers held that
the militia was better fortified with alcohol than firearms and had little sense of the
safe use of either.” Id.
77. See id. at 438 (describing negative public view of militia and arms bearers).
“This widespread rejection of the militia was paralleled in public attitudes toward
hunting.” Id.
78. See Leider, supra note 2, at 1588 (noting public acceptance of right to
possess arms).  Citizens likely initially viewed a right to bear arms distinct from
military service as the right to carry firearms.  Case law reflects this sentiment.  Citi-
zens challenged the constitutionality of every state law (excluding that of Virginia)
prohibiting carrying concealed weapons enacted prior to the Civil War. See id.
79. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 439 (describing negative public view of
militia and arms bearers).  “From the start, hunting was an inessential luxury. In
the first decades of the nineteenth century, hunting was held up to ever-increasing
ridicule as a waste of time, money, and resources and mocked as the play of insuffi-
ciently grown-up boys.” Id.
12
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presence catalyzed shifting public and judicial opinions.80  The me-
dia portrayed arms-bearers as “gentlemen” rather than drunkards
and fools, further contributing to firearm’s national presence.81
While perception shifted from the negative extreme, the nation
had yet to develop today’s fanatical gun culture.82
Today, societal approval of hunting reflects the technology
used.83  Even among hunters, certain technological features draw
criticism.84  Despite negative association of hunting with firearms
and related violence, hunting and gun advocates remain firmly situ-
ated in the United States today.85  Hunters and firearms continue
to draw strong criticism for environmental and firearms reasons.86
80. See id. at 447 (noting correlation between prevalence and societal ap-
proval of firearms in America).  Production improvements enabled more citizens
to own handguns, though they remained prohibitively expensive for a majority of
Americans.  This expense caused citizens to view handguns as a luxury.  Along with
handgun possession, the act of hunting with such a luxury was itself a status symbol
for the wealthy.  Possession of expensive equipment merely for sport rather than
protection was totally unnecessary and became part a lavish American lifestyle. See
id.  After the Civil War a majority of states recognized a personal right to bear
arms.  However, courts found prohibitions against carrying concealed weapons did
not infringe upon the right to bear arms.  “In an era when many men carried
weapons, lawfully or not, the courts interpreted differently worded state constitu-
tional rights to arms so they converged around popular beliefs about the scope of
the right.” See Leider, supra note 2, at 1596 (noting historically recognized right to
possess firearms).
81. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 447 (noting correlation between preva-
lence and societal approval of firearms in America).
82. See id. at 448 (describing shifting societal attitude toward firearms in
America).  While production capabilities made firearms more prevalent in the
United States, Americans did not embrace the supposed need to possess firearms
for personal protection immediately. See id.
83. See RESPONSIVE MANAGEMENT AND THE NATIONAL SHOOTING SPORTS FOUN-
DATION, THE FUTURE OF HUNTING AND SHOOTING SPORTS: RESEARCH-BASED RECRUIT-
MENT AND RETENTION STRATEGIES 167–71 (2008) [hereinafter NAT’L SHOOTING
SPORTS] (providing data on trends in Americans’ perceptions of hunting and fire-
arms).  Americans tend to distinguish gun ownership for personal protection from
gun ownership for hunting.  This is particularly true when hunting firearms con-
tain features rendering the weapons considerably more dangerous and/or accu-
rate than basic handguns.  Approval surveys reflect this sentiment.  A 2007 survey
conducted by Responsive Management reported that only twenty-percent of Amer-
ican adults supported hunting using high tech gear.  Sixty-nine percent of adults
opposed hunting with high tech gear.  The survey specifically referenced gear ena-
bling enhanced vision, hearing, and lasers. See id.
84. See id. (noting lack of support for use of high-tech hunting gear demon-
strated by survey).
85. See SOUTHWICK ASSOCS., HUNTING IN AMERICA: AN ECONOMIC FORCE FOR
CONSERVATION 3 (2012) (providing statistics for hunting in America in recent
years).  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service reported that over thirteen million indi-
viduals over sixteen years old went hunting in 2007.  This number correlates to six
percent of the United States population. See id.
86. See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining self-defense as-
pect of Second Amendment’s military foundation).
13
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However, United States history indicates strong ties between in-
creased prevalence of firearms and public acceptance of firearms.87
Improved societal views certainly seem plausible when considering
the rate at which hunting is growing in popularity the United
States.88  Only time will tell if a theoretical shift in perception of
hunting will impact Second Amendment interpretation.89
III. THERE’S AN APP FOR THAT: TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN
HUNTING AND THE IMPACT ON SECOND
AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Historical context provides insight into legislative intent for
the Second Amendment.90  However, courts give limited weight to
this consideration.91  Hunting technology advances at a rapid pace,
and equipment has advanced to the point of little if any resem-
blance to that available when the Second Amendment passed in
1791.92  Advances in production methods and firearms themselves
have contributed to firearm prevalence in the United States, im-
pacting acceptance of firearms.93
Constitutional interpretation shifts as technology advances.94
Courts and legislatures must adjust to determine if new technology
87. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 454–55 (providing overview of public atti-
tude concerning firearms in United States).
88. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (providing hunting statistics).
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service reported that the number of hunters in the
United States increased by nine percent between 2006 and 2011.  At the same
time, expenditures on hunting increased by over thirty percent. See id.
89. See O’Shea, supra note 3, at 598 (interpreting Second Amendment’s in-
tended conduct).  The Second Amendment secures an individual right to own and
carry firearms for personal security.  The right revolves around a need of individu-
als to defend themselves.  Simultaneously, the right may extend to other tradition-
ally legally protected conduct, which some argue includes hunting. See id.
90. See id. (discussing Second Amendment’s intended scope of protected
conduct).
91. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (upholding
firearms possession restriction).
92. See NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS, supra note 83, at 167 (providing data on
trends in Americans’ perceptions of hunting and firearms). See Important Dates in
the History of Firearms, AM. FIREARMS INST., http://www.americanfirearms.org/gun-
history/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) [hereinafter History of Firearms] (providing
timeline for critical dates in history of firearms).
93. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 454–55 (providing overview of public atti-
tude concerning firearms in United States).
94. See O’Shea, supra note 3, at 598 (distinguishing firearm categories covered
by Second Amendment).  “The only constitutionally protected weapons were those
that had value for militia service—the ordinary military equipment. Most hand-
guns did not qualify. Post-Civil War courts recognized a broad right to keep arms
in the home and, in general, a very limited right to bear arms in public.” Id.
14
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falls within extant laws.95  Nonetheless, original intent plays a role
in constitutional interpretation.96  No court could logically con-
clude the Second Amendment’s coverage extends only to mus-
kets.97  This argument errs to the same extent as a erroneously
broad interpretation.98  Analogizing to the more developed First
Amendment jurisprudence, courts find exceptions to even the most
critical Bill of Rights securities.99  Thus, proper Second Amend-
ment interpretation similarly lies between the two extremes.100
In colonial America, guns were far more scarce than public
perception often assumes.101  Lack of efficient production mini-
mized the presence of guns.102  Firearm technology in colonial
America was limited to that brought over from Europe.103  Con-
straints on production and materials rendered firearms barely re-
sembled those used today.104  Early firearms in America were
95. See, e.g., Leider, supra note 2, at 1588 (describing gaps in Second Amend-
ment interpretation).
96. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 85 (upholding firearms possession restriction).
97. See O’Shea, supra note 3, at 598 (noting technology’s impact on Second
Amendment interpretation).  “It may be well true today that a militia, to be as
effective as militias in the [eighteenth] century, would require sophisticated arms
that are highly unusual in society at large . . . . But the fact that modern develop-
ments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the pro-
tected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.” See id.
98. See id. (describing shortcomings of originalist Second Amendment
interpretation).
99. See id. at 605 (explaining that other constitutional rights extend beyond
strict textual interpretation).
100. See id. at 608 (describing hybrid right to bear arms).
101. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 443 (describing developing gun industry
and production capabilities in colonial America).  The early American firearm in-
dustry faced enormous production limitations.  For example, one of the earliest
gunsmiths in colonial America created a firearms production business that thrived
for two centuries yet produced fewer than thirty guns annually. See id.
102. See id. at 443–44 (describing quality of original firearms available in colo-
nial America).  Early firearms fell into two categories: functional for hunting and
beautifully designed merely for show and status.  Most firearms were not functional
but rather owned as heirlooms and not kept in working order. See id. “Around
1750, men stop carrying rapiers, and guns became the weapon of choice for a
duel.” See Gun Timeline, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/tech-
nique/gun-timeline/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (providing timeline of gun tech-
nology from 1364 through 1900).
103. See Jim Supica, A Brief History of Firearms, NRA NAT’L FIREARMS MUSEUM,
http://www.nramuseum.org/gun-info-research/a-brief-history-of-firearms.aspx
(last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (providing overview of technological advancements in
firearms through present day).  Original gunsmiths in colonial American drew
upon European firearm technology and designs. See id.
104. See id. (describing early gun features).  Early firearms consisted of three
basic components: lock, stock, and barrel.  The lock ignites the gunpowder.  The
stock is the apparatus upon which a barrel is mounted.  The barrel provides the
channel through which bullets pass upon ignition.  Together these three elements
compromise the most rudimentary firearms. See id.
15
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rudimentary; the greatest technological improvements comprised
basic improvements to accuracy and keeping gunpowder dry.105
While vast improvements occurred in the 1600s, the industry did
not achieve quality results by today’s standards until a few hundred
years later.106
Much like societal attitudes in the nineteenth century, gun
technology underwent rapid transition.107  Congress began to dedi-
cate significant expenditures to expansion of American production
where the nation previously relied upon Europe.108  However, this
increased demand far outpaced production capability in the United
States.109  While capacity for production grew from improvements
such as interchangeable parts, output continued to fall short of in-
creased demands.110  Eventually production capabilities rose and
increased the presence of firearms throughout the nation.111
105. See id. (describing colonial American gun features).
106. See History of Firearms, supra note 92 (providing timeline for critical dates
in history of firearms).
107. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 443 (describing quality of original fire-
arms available in colonial America).  The majority of firearms in existence prior to
the Civil War were not functional but rather decorative for display, status, and
heirlooms.  Production technology limited gun possession to members of the mili-
tary or elite members of society wealthy enough to afford a hand-crafted firearm.
See id.
108. See id. at 445–46 (describing historical government support of firearms
industry).  In 1808 Congress apportioned a considerable amount of the federal
budget to equipping the military.  With an initial annual budget of $200,000, Con-
gress sought to increase the presence of firearms in the United States.  This gov-
ernment backing fueled increased production and consequently prevalence of
firearms across the nation. See id.
109. See id. at 446 (describing early Congressional efforts to bolster firearms
industry).  “No shop was too small to escape the government’s efforts at financial
encouragement.  Yet even with these efforts, Congress failed to fulfill its constitu-
tional mandate of arming the militia in any year prior to the Civil War.  Production
levels in the United States just could not keep up with congressional demands.” Id.
110. See Interchangeable Parts, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/inven-
tions/interchangeable-parts (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (describing progress of pro-
duction improvements enabled by Eli Whitney’s interchangeable parts).  In 1798
the government commissioned Eli Whitney to produce 10,000 muskets by the early
1800s.  Whitney failed spectacularly, failing to produce a single firearm by 1801.
See id.
111. See id. (describing Eli Whitney’s contribution to firearms production).
Eli Whitney contributed considerably to mass production capabilities by devising
plans to divide labor and use interchangeable parts.  However, production still
paled in comparison to expectations.  Whitney eventually completed an order for
10,000 muskets due by 1800 six years late.  Nonetheless, continued improvements
enabled Whitney to more than double his output after the initial order.  He pro-
duced an additional 15,000 firearms, one hundred and fifty percent of his original
order, four years after completing his first order.  This unprecedented growth in
production capabilities set in motion a steady stream of production improvements
that continued after the close of the Civil War. See id.
16
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At the tail-end of the Industrial Revolution, manufacturing im-
provements triggered massive growth in firearm production.112
Tremendous governmental support further spurred production im-
provements.113  Simultaneously, the Colt revolver eliminated the
constant need to reload.114  Up until the arrival of mass-production
techniques and the Colt revolver in 1835, firearms remained more
form than function.115
The Civil War provided a catalyst for unprecedented demand
in the firearms industry.116  The growth in demand persisted, with
government support contributing to a stable presence embodied in
the National Rifle Association (NRA).117  Gun features and produc-
112. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 446–47 (describing evolution of firearms
production in America).
113. See id. (describing evolution of firearms production in America).  Fire-
arm production continued to take off through the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury.  Production capability grew at an unprecedented rate, due largely to
substantial government contributions.  The United States government furnished
the funding, intellectual property protection, technology, and a steady demand for
firearms in the military.  It also provided both supply and demand in a rapidly
developing firearms industry. See id.
114. See Billy Hallowell, The History and Evolution of Guns as Told Through Pic-
tures, THE BLAZE (Mar. 12, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/
2013/03/12/the-history-and-evolution-of-guns-as-told-through-pictures/ (provid-
ing visual and descriptive history of firearms from 1364 through present time).
The first multi-shot, revolving firearms that were mass produced came
from Samuel Colt.  Colt produced a gun that enabled people to fire mul-
tiple shots without reloading – a development that forever changed war-
fare.  By mass-producing these weapons, the inventor made them more
affordable and . . . their accuracy and reliability made them useful among
hunters and soldiers, alike.
See id.
115. See PBS, supra note 102 (providing timeline of gun technology from 1364
through 1900).  The Colt Revolver combined mass production technology with
accuracy capabilities that made the firearm far superior to its predecessors.  Af-
fordability and shooting technology finally came together in a weapon readily
available for the masses. See id.
116. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 452 (describing Civil War acting as catalyst
for firearms industry expansion in America).
The Civil War dramatically accelerated the slow cultural shift that had
been instigated by the increase in arms production in the 1840s.  By 1865
it would seem that most Americans believed that the ability to use a gun
made one a better man as well as a patriot more able to defend the na-
tion’s liberties.
Id.  Additionally, “[t]echnological innovation coupled with government support
had powerfully altered the national character and sensibilities within a single gen-
eration.” Id.
117. See id. at 453 (describing government endorsement of firearms).  After
establishing a secure foothold for the firearms industry in America in the nine-
teenth century, the government proceeded to take a more passive role in later
years.  However, the government did actively participate in the expansion of gun
culture in the United States by subsidizing the National Rifle Association.  The
organization sought and continues to seek a longstanding place for firearms in
17
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tion capability massively improved.118  The ability to shoot un-
hindered by continuous reloading changed warfare entirely.119  In
1861, even greater capabilities for rapid firing arrived in the Gatling
Gun.120  This new technology was a precursor to the “first truly fully
automatic machine guns” of the 1880s.121  Rapid progress within
the firearms industry provided further support of growing accept-
ance and prevalence of firearms in the nation.122  This momentum
built, with unceasing advancements occurring regularly since the
Antebellum era.123  These changes impacted the court’s definition
of firearms.124  However, the Second Amendment remained tied to
the military.125
Firearm technology continues to improve at a rapid pace.126
Growing expenditures on firearms and other hunting equipment
America much like the government did in fostering the entire firearms industry.
See id.  “National Rifle Association (NRA) was incorporated in 1871 to provide fire-
arms training and encourage interest in shooting sports.” See History of Firearms,
supra note 92 (providing timeline for critical dates in history of firearms).  As the
NRA sought to increase the presence of firearms in the United States, government
contributions indirectly sought to contribute to that cause by expanding the pres-
ence, technology, and utility of firearms throughout the nation. See id.
118. See Hallowell, supra note 114 (providing visual and descriptive history of
firearms from 1364 through present time).  Firearm technology improved drasti-
cally in the middle of the nineteenth century, exemplified by developments such
as the pin fire cartridge and the first shotguns. See id.
119. See id. (describing advances in gun technology).  A critical improvement
to firearm technology was the capability of repeated firing rather than firing a
single shot and being forced to reload immediately. See id.
120. See Supica, supra note 103 (providing overview of technological advance-
ments in firearms through present day).  The Gatling gun introduced Americans
to truly rapid fire and repetitive shooting capabilities.  The gun’s multiple rotating
barrels enabled its shooter to continue firing shots with ammunition supply serv-
ing as the only limiting factor. See id.  In 1861 Americans were introduced to the
Gatling gun.  “The Gatling gun was a hand-driven, crank-operated, multi-barreled,
machine gun.  The first machine gun with reliable loading, the Gatling gun had
the ability to fire sustained multiple bursts.” See Hallowell, supra note 114 (provid-
ing visual and descriptive history of firearms from 1364 through present time).
121. See Hallowell, supra note 114 (providing visual and descriptive history of
firearms from 1364 through present time).  A fully-automatic machine gun is capa-
ble of firing continuously while the shooter holds the trigger down, as opposed to
the Gatling gun’s crank mechanism. See id.
122. See History of Firearms, supra note 92 (providing timeline for critical dates
in history of firearms).
123. See id. (detailing chronology of firearm development).
124. See Leider, supra note 2, at 1588 (noting Second Amendment ties to mili-
tary firearms).  Most states recognized an individual right to possess and carry arms
by the beginning of the twentieth century.  Individual weapons were easily distin-
guished from military weapons in strength and shooting capability. See id.
125. See id. (noting Second Amendment ties to military).
126. See Supica, supra note 103 (providing overview of technological advance-
ments in firearms through present day).  Hunting firearms today evolve consist-
ently to bring on enhanced shooting capabilities and additional features. See id.
18
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reflected a voracious appetite of hunters for improved weaponry.127
Developments in ammunition, semi-automatic shooting capabili-
ties, and use of lightweight materials have yielded more easily-used
weapons.128  Weapon accuracy improved dramatically.129  New fea-
tures allowed electronic targeting, night vision, and laser aiming sys-
tems.130  This improved accuracy comes into play with New
Hampshire’s proposed regulation banning smart rifles, which pro-
vide a degree of accuracy that some legislators consider unethi-
cal.131  As firearms resemble those envisioned by the framers less
and less, legislatures and courts alike must consider what this means
for the Second Amendment.132  Advanced technology may remove
hunting gear such as smart rifles from the Second Amendment’s
scope.133  Additionally, courts may determine that the act of hunt-
ing falls outside of the Second Amendment’s scope.134
IV. ANALYSIS: SHOT THROUGH THE HEART—DOES NEW
HAMPSHIRE’S PROPOSED REGULATION IMPINGE
UPON A SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT?
A. New Hampshire Proposed Regulation: Direct Hit
or Missing the Mark?
A New Hampshire proposed regulation seeks to limit hunting
based on equipment rather than time or location.135  Considering
127. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (providing statistics for hunting
in America in recent years).  In 2012, the estimated 13,700,000 hunters in the
United States spent $38.3 billion on hunting related expenditures, generating
more income than Google and the Goldman Sachs Group.  “If hunting were a
company, the amount spent by sportsmen to support their hunting activities would
place it number [seventy-three] on the Fortune 500 list.” Id.
128. See id. (providing statistics for hunting in America in recent years).
129. See id. (describing improvements in firearm accuracy).  One notable fea-
ture that has seen remarkable improvement over the years is vision technology on
firearms.  Vision aids on firearms used in the nineteenth century are a far cry from
the advanced scopes developed in the later twentieth century and continuously
improved through present day. See id.
130. See Supica, supra note 103 (providing overview of technological advance-
ments in firearms through present day).
131. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (proposing equipment regula-
tion and noting moral reasoning behind proposal).
132. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010) (distin-
guishing hunting from self-defense).
133. See id. (distinguishing hunting from self-defense).
134. See, e.g., infra note 194 and accompanying text.
135. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t
312.03 (2015).  Per the proposed regulation,
[t]he Fish and Game Department is proposing to adopt Fis 312 to regu-
late the method and manner of taking wildlife with respect to emerging
technologies. Specifically, the new rule would (i) ban the taking, driving,
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America’s pervasive gun culture, it is likely that passage of this and
any similar regulation will face Second Amendment challenges.136
Though the regulation differs from those previously considered by
courts under Second Amendment challenges, it would likely also be
upheld.137
Given that statutes infringing upon the designated “core” con-
duct protected by the Second Amendment are upheld, it is even
less likely a plaintiff would find success in a suit challenging a hunt-
ing regulation.138 Hunters in particular highlights the unlikely suc-
cess on the merits of such a claim.139  Despite strong ties to hunting
and firearms in the United States,140 a continued lack of prece-
dence mars claimed Second Amendment rights for hunters.141
B. Give Me Smart Rifles or Give Me Death: Hypothetical New
Hampshire Suit
Should hunters in New Hampshire bring suit against the state
for an alleged Second Amendment violation, the case would likely
draw from the framework applied in Heller (later applied by Marz-
zarella and Skoien) and Hunters.142  A hypothetical suit would draw
from issues raised by both sets of cases but factually resemble
Hunters.143  All cases referenced support a conclusion of denial of
or locating of wildlife using an unmanned aerial vehicle, (ii) ban the use
of smart rifles for taking wildlife, and (iii) ban the use of live action game
cameras to locate wildlife for the purpose of taking said wildlife.
35 N.H. Rulemaking Reg. 1 (Jan. 8, 2015) (proposing ban of smart rifles).
136. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (providing statistics for hunting
in America in recent years).
137. See Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pennsylvania Game Comm’n,
28 F. Supp. 3d 340 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (rejecting Second Amendment application to
hunting).
138. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (uphold-
ing firearms possession restriction).
139. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340 (rejecting Second Amendment applica-
tion to hunting).
140. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (providing statistics for hunting
in America in recent years).
141. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340–41 (noting lack of precedent applying
Second Amendment to hunting).  “Plaintiffs acknowledge that no legal precedent
establishes a constitutional right to hunt . . . .” Id.
142. See infra note 195 and accompanying text; see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at
85 (providing Second Amendment claim framework); United States v. Skoien, 614
F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010) (providing Second Amendment claim framework);
Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (providing Second Amendment claim framework).
143. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (providing case facts).
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Second Amendment protection to hunters in New Hampshire con-
sidering their Second Amendment analysis framework.144
1. D.C. v. Heller
In D.C. v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Second
Amendment’s central meaning for the first time in seventy years.145
The District of Columbia passed legislation barring handgun regis-
tration, requiring licensing for pistols, and requiring legal firearms
to be kept unloaded and disassembled or trigger-locked.146  In re-
sponse, a group of citizens brought suit claiming the laws violated
their Second Amendment rights.147  The federal court in the Dis-
trict of Columbia disagreed, holding that the Second Amendment
applied exclusively to militias rather than private gun ownership.148
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed,
holding that the Second Amendment protects private gun own-
ers.149  The case finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking a
conclusive answer to whether the Second Amendment shields pri-
vate use of handguns and other firearms within the home.150
In a five-four decision, the Court held that the Second Amend-
ment protects a personal right to firearm ownership unrelated to
the military.151  The Court looked to the Second Amendment’s text
and that of relevant state constitutions adopted soon after the Con-
stitution.152 Heller essentially rejected rational basis application to
Second Amendment claims.153  However, the Court’s acceptance of
categorical restrictions on Second Amendment rights suggested in-
applicability of strict scrutiny as well.154  Similar to the First Amend-
ment, the right to bear arms is not absolute but allows for
144. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 85 (providing Second Amendment frame-
work); see also Skoien, 614 F.3d at 639 (providing Second Amendment framework);
Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (providing Second Amendment framework).
145. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008) (outlining
Heller issues); see also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (marking prior
instance in which Court addressed Second Amendment before Heller).
146. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 573 (describing firearm legislation in question).
147. See id. at 570 (providing case history).
148. See id. at 570–71 (providing case history).
149. See id. at 571 (providing case history).
150. See id. (outlining case issues).
151. See id. (finding Second Amendment right beyond military use of
firearms).
152. See id. at 573–74 (interpreting Second Amendment text).
153. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639 (synthesizing Heller’s Sec-
ond Amendment analysis).
154. See infra note 194 and accompanying text (suggesting strict scrutiny not
appropriate).
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concessions.155  The Court left future courts to determine which
categorical restrictions states may enact without offending the Sec-
ond Amendment.156  Looking to the First Amendment provides
limited guidance in this area.157  First Amendment case law carves
out a number of clearly defined exceptions to the rights to free
speech and religion.158  Second Amendment case law is far less de-
veloped, as evidenced by Heller’s novelty.159
While the Heller Court addressed the Second Amendment’s
scope, it warned that its decision did not call into question “long-
standing” and “presumptively lawful” firearm laws.160  The Court
also failed to specify the appropriate standard of review for Second
Amendment claims.161  This lack of direction forces lower courts to
wrestle with their own interpretations of Second Amendment appli-
cation.162 U.S. v. Marzzarella and U.S. v. Skoien exemplify the appli-
cation of Heller’s minimal guidance and lower courts’ continuing
need to construct their own approaches to Second Amendment
claims.163
2. D.C. v. Heller Application in U.S. v. Marzzarella
In U.S. v. Marzzarella, the defendant was convicted for “posses-
sion of a firearm with an obliterated serial number.”164  The statute
in question criminalized the “transport[ation], ship[ment], or
recei[pt], in interstate or foreign commerce, any firearm which has
had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed. . .”165
The defendant claimed that the statute “violated his Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms,” which the court re-
155. See id. (suggesting strict scrutiny not appropriate).
156. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
158. See id.
159. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
160. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625–27 (2008) (caution-
ing about limited reach of case holding).
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qual-
ifications on the commercial sale of arms.
Id. at 626–27.
161. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
162. See id.
163. See infra note 194 and accompanying text; infra note 198 and accompany-
ing text.
164. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2010) (provid-
ing case facts).
165. See id. (providing case facts).
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jected.166  The defendant appealed, but the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, upholding the statute.167
The court relied on District of Columbia v. Heller in its hold-
ing.168 Marzzarella utilized the two-prong Second Amendment anal-
ysis from the prior case.169  Upholding a categorical restriction on
handgun possession, the court noted a fundamental right pro-
tected by the Second Amendment.170
Under the first prong, the court considers the conduct regu-
lated by legislation.171  In considering conduct, the court evaluates
the foundation of Second Amendment protection.172  Defining
breadth of Second Amendment protection necessarily requires
analysis of constitutional intent.173  The court reiterated that Sec-
ond Amendment protection is limited in scope of protection of-
166. See id. (providing case facts).
167. See id. (providing case facts).
168. See id. at 88–89 (noting limitations on Second Amendment protection).
The court noted a “core” right of the Second Amendment to bear arms for per-
sonal protection of lawful individuals.  While securing this individual right, the
court noted that the Second Amendment is subject to the same limitations of
other Bill of Rights securities.  The Second Amendment is thus not absolute, but
may be limited by legislation without necessarily impinging upon a constitutional
right. See id.
169. See id. at 89 (describing Second Amendment claim analysis).
First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.  If it does
not, our inquiry is complete.  If it does, we evaluate the law under some
form of means-end scrutiny.  If the law passes muster under that stan-
dard, it is constitutional.  If it fails, it is invalid.
Id. (citations omitted).
170. See id. (limiting Second Amendment applicability).
171. See id. (limiting Second Amendment applicability).
172. See id. (describing Second Amendment claim analysis).  The court’s pri-
mary inquiry is whether the conduct in question falls within the Second Amend-
ment’s scope.  If the court determines that it does not, there is no constitutional
infringement.  If the conduct is within the scope of the Second Amendment, the
court proceeds with its inquiry.  The court in Marzzarella sought to determine if
personal possession of unmarked firearms fell within the scope of Second Amend-
ment protected conduct. See id.
173. See id. at 89–90 (describing contextual impact on Second Amendment
scope).  Courts consider the context in which a constitutional right arose.  This
consideration provides insight to the intent of lawmakers in the text’s enactment
and what exactly lawmakers sought to ensure for the American people.  Taking
this into consideration, the court concluded that the Second Amendment incorpo-
rated an individual right to firearm possession for purposes of self-defense and
security. See id.
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fered to citizens.174  This conclusion would extend to New
Hampshire’s categorical regulation.175
The court’s reference to bases for categorical restrictions is
particularly apt to a hypothetical New Hampshire suit.176  The New
Hampshire legislators conceptualized the proposed regulation due
to immorality of use of particular types of equipment.177  A court
may find that the unfailing accuracy of smart rifles renders them
equally “dangerous and unusual.”178  This categorization would
render the proposed regulation permissible and constitutionally
valid.179
The court may consider historical context in interpreting
scope of protection, which requires consideration of original in-
tent.180  This makes for a particularly strong case against smart rifles
due to lack of resemblance between current technology and that in
existence during Second Amendment enactment.181  Using this
logic, smart rifles fall outside the scope of protection.182  However,
courts have rejected this extreme originalist interpretation.183  Re-
174. See id. at 90 (noting limited protection of Second Amendment).  The
right to bear arms secured by the Second Amendment is not absolute.  It may be
limited by legislation without necessarily infringing upon the constitutional right
so long as it does not deny the core right of lawful citizens to possess firearms for
traditionally lawful purposes. See id.
175. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t
312.03 (2015) (banning use of certain categories of hunting technology).
176. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (noting categorical lack of Second Amend-
ment protection for some firearms).  Specifically, the court noted it was
clear that restrictions on the possession of dangerous and unusual weapons are not
constitutionally suspect because “those weapons are outside the ambit of the
amendment. . . By equating the list of presumptively lawful regulations with restric-
tions on dangerous and unusual weapons, we believe the court intended to treat
them equivalently – as exceptions to the Second Amendment guarantee.”
See id.
177. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t at
312.03 (banning use of certain types of hunting technology).
178. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (justifying Second Amendment scope
limitation).
179. See id. (justifying Second Amendment scope limitation).
180. See id. (justifying Second Amendment scope limitation).
181. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t at
312.03 (proposing ban on use of certain categories of hunting technology).
182. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (limiting Second Amendment protection).
183. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1275 (9th ed. 2009) (defining Originalism).
Originalism is “[t]he doctrine that words of a legal instrument are to be given the
meanings they had when they were adopted.” Id.  In additional to word definition
Originalism, the doctrine holds “that a legal text should be interpreted through
the historical ascertainment of the meaning that it would have conveyed to a fully
informed observer at the time when the text first took effect.” Id.  In the case of
the Second Amendment, this principle dictates that “firearms” include those envi-
sioned by drafters of the Second Amendment, a narrow interpretation rejected in
a number of recent Second Amendment cases, particularly in light of changing
24
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol23/iss1/6
2016] UP IN ARMS 279
gardless, a claim for smart rifle protection would likely fail even
with more flexible Second Amendment interpretation.184  Recent
suits establish a clear analysis for Second Amendment claims, and
those cases have yet to establish outer limits, though none defini-
tively include hunting within the scope.185  A New Hampshire suit,
like Hunters, may be dismissed without applying Second Amend-
ment analysis.186
If a court finds the Second Amendment applicable, it proceeds
to the second prong.187  Under the second prong, the court applies
the appropriate level of scrutiny.188  The appropriate level is not
clearly defined for Second Amendment claims, which allows courts
some flexibility.189  Rational basis would be an inappropriate stan-
dard.190  Heightened scrutiny is the proper standard for a funda-
mental right.191  However, even under strict scrutiny, courts have
upheld restrictions on Second Amendment conduct.192
technology and firearm uses. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (rejecting originalist
approach to Second Amendment interpretation).  In rejecting an overly narrow
Second Amendment interpretation, the court noted that
Heller cautions against using such a historically fact-bound approach when
defining the types of weapons within a scope of the right. Some have
made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in
existence in the 18th century were protected by the Second Amendment.
We do not interpret constitutional rights that way.
Id.
184. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (rejecting rigid Second Amendment
interpretation).
185. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t at
312.03 (banning use of certain categories of hunting technology).
186. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89–90 (providing Second Amendment claim
analysis).
187. See id. at 89–90 (providing Second Amendment claim analysis).
188. See id. at 96 (providing Second Amendment claim analysis).
189. See id. at 95–96 (noting lack of scrutiny assigned in Second Amendment
infringement suits). Heller failed to provide an express standard under which fire-
arms possession laws are to be evaluated.  The Court merely noted that the law in
question would fail under any level of scrutiny applied. See id.
190. See id. (noting lack of established standard).
191. See id. (determining appropriate level of scrutiny).  “[S]ome form of
heightened scrutiny must have applied.” See Leider, supra note 2, at 1588.  Rather
than dictating the proper level of scrutiny, Heller merely ruled out rational basis as
an appropriate evaluator of laws impacting Second Amendment rights. See id.
192. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 85 (upholding restrictive firearms statute over
alleged Second Amendment infringement); see also United States v. Skoien, 614
F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding restrictive firearms statute over alleged
Second Amendment infringement); Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Penn-
sylvania Game Comm’n, 28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 345 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (upholding hunt-
ing limitation statute over alleged Second Amendment infringement).
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Marzzarella’s statute differs from New Hampshire’s in categori-
zation type.193  The court in Marzzarella regulated “the manner in
which any person may lawfully exercise their Second Amendment
rights.”194  New Hampshire’s proposed regulation regulates a class
of firearms.195  The regulation does not preclude possession of
smart rifles but prohibits use of the equipment in a particular con-
text: hunting.196  A court may find this a limitation on “manner” in
which individuals exercise the right to bear arms.197  This distinc-
tion may result in application of intermediate scrutiny rather than
strict scrutiny.198  Lowering the standard to intermediate scrutiny
increases the likelihood of upholding a statute.199
The outcome under strict scrutiny application is less clear.200
However, courts have found Second Amendment restrictions valid
under strict scrutiny.201  Rationale behind the ban on use of smart
rifles differs from that prohibiting firearm possession.202  New
Hampshire legislators note that the ban stems from immorality of
using such equipment.203  Lawmakers noted that the unnatural ad-
vantage provided by technology necessitated equipment
limitations.204
193. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t
312.03 (2015) (categorically banning certain types of hunting equipment in New
Hampshire).
194. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (analyzing challenged firearms possession
restriction statute).  The court considered the law in question a regulation in the
manner in which an individual may possess firearms rather than a categorical re-
striction on particular types of firearms.  This same distinction between type of
conduct and manner in which protected conduct may be expressed appears in
First Amendment precedent. See id.
195. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t at
312.03 (categorically banning certain types of hunting equipment in New
Hampshire).
196. See id. (categorically banning certain types of hunting equipment).
197. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (distinguishing types of Second Amend-
ment restrictions).
198. See id. (recognizing firearms possession rights).
199. See id. at 97–98 (noting judicial standard’s impact on case outcome).
200. See id. at 99 (noting comparatively undeveloped Second Amendment
body of case law).  Second Amendment interpretation looks to First Amendment
interpretation for guidance.  First Amendment case law is far more developed than
Second Amendment case law, which has but a single Supreme Court decision in
the past one hundred years providing authority. See id.
201. See id. (noting lack of developed Second Amendment case law).
202. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t
312.03 (2015) (describing ban on certain types of hunting equipment in New
Hampshire).
203. See id. (describing categorical hunting ban).
204. See id. (describing categorical hunting ban).
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3. D.C. v. Heller Application in U.S. v. Skoien
In U.S. v. Skoien, the defendant’s prior convictions prevented
him from carrying “[f]irearms in or affecting interstate com-
merce.”205  Nonetheless, the defendant was later convicted for pos-
session of three firearms.206  The defendant claimed that the law
violated his Second Amendment rights.  The court disagreed and
upheld the statute.207  The defendant appealed, but the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.208
Skoien analyzed Second Amendment rights in the context of
firearms possession rather than hunting.209  However, the case pro-
vides a comprehensive analysis for categorical Second Amendment
claims by touching upon several critical considerations.210 Skoien
distinguished the Second Amendment rights secured by Heller from
those still undefined and noted the importance of the proper level
of scrutiny in Second Amendment claims.211  Additionally, the
court analyzed categorical restrictions under the Second Amend-
ment.212  This consideration would apply to a hypothetical claim
under New Hampshire’s restriction on specific hunting equip-
205. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010) (distin-
guishing hunting from self-defense).
206. See id. (detailing defendant’s possession of pistol, rifle, and shotgun).
207. See id. (upholding restrictive firearms legislation).
208. See id. (rejecting defendant’s claim).
209. See id. at 641 (providing Second Amendment challenge framework).
210. See id. at 639 (determining constitutionality of statute).  The court noted
that it must first determine whether Congress may enact categorical limitations on
Second Amendment conduct prior to considering the alleged impact on hunting.
See id.
211. See id. (exploring standard of review for Second Amendment claim).  Ap-
plying rational basis to Second Amendment legislation would not comport with
the treatment of other Bill of Rights securities.  While the proper level of scrutiny
is yet to be determined, the minimal protection offered by rational basis would
render the Second Amendment useless in securing a right to possess firearms as
the deference granted to the government under such a standard would almost
certainly ensure the upholding of any law impacting the right to bear arms. See id.
212. See id. (noting permissibility of certain legislative firearm restrictions).
Categorical limits may exist without impinging upon constitutional rights.  The
First Amendment in particular provides an example of a fundamental right subject
to numerous exceptions that Congress may proscribe. See id.  Thus, even if a court
concluded that the Second Amendment applies to hunters in a hypothetical New
Hampshire suit, categorical restrictions applicable to Second Amendment rights
are not presumptively invalid. See id.
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ment.213  A court may consider New Hampshire’s statute a categori-
cal restriction under the Second Amendment.214
4. Hunters United for Sunday Hunting
The Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code generally prohibits
hunting on Sundays.215  The blue law prohibits the hunting of big
game on Sundays, with exceptions in game type and hunting
location.216
Hunters examined the constitutionality of the prohibition.217  A
group of hunters claimed that the Pennsylvania Gaming Commis-
sion violated their First Amendment, Second Amendment, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.218  The District Court of the Middle
213. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t
312.03 (2015) (categorizing ban on certain types of hunting equipment in New
Hampshire).
214. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (finding some Second Amendment possession
restrictions permissible).
215. See Hunting on Sunday Prohibited, 34 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2303 (West 2016)
(banning hunting on Sundays).
(a) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in this title, it is unlawful
for any person to hunt for any furbearer or game on Sunday.
(b) Construction of section. This section shall not be construed to
prohibit:
(1) The training of dogs.
(2) The participation in dog trials as provided for in this title.
(3) The removal of lawfully taken game or wildlife from traps or the
resetting of the traps on Sunday.
(b.1) Exceptions. Subsection (a) shall not apply to:
(1) The hunting of foxes.
(2) The hunting of coyotes.
(3) Any hunting which occurs on noncommercial regulated hunting
grounds holding a valid permit under section 2928(b)(2) (relating
to regulated hunting grounds permits).
(c) Penalty. A violation of this section is a summary offense of the fifth
degree.
See id.
216. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (9th ed. 2009) (defining Blue Law).  A
blue law prohibits particular conduct and commercial activities on Sundays.  Such
laws still exist, though they are far less common since 1980 when courts began to
find them invalid due to their religious roots.  Blue laws may be upheld if a court
finds justification for the law aside form religious observation. See id. “Big game
consists of white-tailed deer, black bear, elk and wild turkey, whereas small game
consists of woodcock, rabbit, pheasant, northern bobwhite, quail, ruffled grouse,
groundhog, and squirrel.”  Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pennsylvania
Game Comm’n, 28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 342 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (defining big game).
“[B]y statute, foxes, coyotes, crows, and feral hog are excepted from the Sunday
hunting restriction, meaning that these animals may be taken on Sunday.” Id.
217. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340 (challenging constitutionality of hunt-
ing restriction).
218. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340 (challenging constitutionality of hunt-
ing restriction).  The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
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District of Pennsylvania disagreed and held that the Second
Amendment did not apply to hunters.219
Hunters and a hypothetical New Hampshire suit both involve
restrictions on hunting firearms rather than those used for self-de-
fense.220  Both statutes regulate recreational hunting with sweeping
restrictions.221  However, neither case involves an outright hunting
ban.222  New Hampshire regulates by equipment while Pennsylvania
law involves temporal restrictions.223  Both statutes provide a num-
ber of exceptions to their limitations.224
Hunters applies the previously mentioned two-prong frame-
work.225  The court noted the unresolved scope of Second Amend-
ment coverage.226  Like other cases, the court found hunting
outside the foundational protection of the Second Amendment.227
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.  The Second Amendment provides: “A well-regulated Militia, be-
ing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.  No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
219. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340 (challenging constitutionality of hunt-
ing restriction).
220. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t
312.03 (2015) (describing categorical ban on certain types of hunting equipment
in New Hampshire).
221. See id. (detailing hunting restrictions).
222. See id. describing categorical ban on certain types of hunting equipment
in New Hampshire)
223. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340–41 (challenging statute prohibiting
hunting on Sundays).
224. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t at
312.03 (describing categorical ban on certain types of hunting equipment in New
Hampshire); see also Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (challenging statute prohibiting
hunting on Sundays).
225. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (applying Second Amendment frame-
work used in firearms possession legislation cases).
226. See id. (noting lack of precedent for extension of Second Amendment to
hunting).  The Second Amendment’s scope is not fully defined by case law but has
yet to definitively include hunting. See id.
227. See id. (noting lack of Second Amendment precedent).
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5. Application to Hypothetical New Hampshire Suit
It is likely a court would feel the same reluctance to explicitly
define or expand the Second Amendment’s scope in a New Hamp-
shire suit.228  Applying this rationale, the court rejected Second
Amendment coverage to hunters.229  It is difficult to see why a court
would reject this rational argument in a hypothetical New Hamp-
shire suit, considering the similarities between the statutes.230  If the
Second Amendment does not apply to the conduct implicated, as
the court concluded in Hunters, there will be no need to proceed to
any scrutiny determination in a New Hampshire suit.231  The statute
would likely be similarly upheld.232  However, uncertainty remains
due to clear definition of the appropriate level of scrutiny, permissi-
bility of categorical restrictions, distinction between hunting and
core Second Amendment conduct, and advances in hunting tech-
nology.233  Together, these factors suggest that hunting legislation
falls outside the reach of the Second Amendment.234
Heller rejected rational basis application to Second Amend-
ment claims.235  Strict scrutiny also appears to be an improper stan-
dard based on the minimal guidance provided by Heller.236  Thus,
the appropriate standard must fall somewhere on the spectrum be-
tween the highest and lowest level of scrutiny.237  However, narrow-
228. See id. at 345–46 (questioning outer limits of Second Amendment).
Courts have yet to determine the boundaries of conduct protected by the Second
Amendment beyond basic self-defense in an individual’s home.  It is up to future
courts to determine the extent of protection afforded. See id.
229. See id. (questioning outer limits of Second Amendment).
230. See Smart Rifles, 35 N.H. Rulemaking Reg. 1 (Jan. 8, 2015) (commenting
on lack of Second Amendment violation in the proposed Regulation).
231. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345–46. (rejecting Second Amendment
application to hunting).  The court rejected the contention that the Second
Amendment applied to hunting due an absence of precedent suggesting such.  Be-
cause the court determined that the conduct fell outside the scope of Second
Amendment conduct, it halted its inquiry before evaluating the legislation under
any level of scrutiny. See id. See also Smart Rifles, 35 N.H. Rulemaking Reg. 1 (Jan.
8, 2015) (commenting on lack of Second Amendment violation in proposed
Regulation).
232. See Smart Rifles, 35 N.H. Rulemaking Reg. 1 (Jan. 8, 2015) (commenting
on lack of Second Amendment violation in proposed Regulation).
233. See, e.g., supra note 189 and accompanying text (noting lack of definite
level of scrutiny).
234. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
236. See id.
237. See id.
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ing the standard even marginally still leaves a number of gaps for
courts to fill in the future.238
One of these gaps is what categorical restrictions are permissi-
ble under the Second Amendment.239  First Amendment opinions
distinguish the regulation of particular categories of conduct from
those regulating the manner in which conduct may be carried
out.240  While this provides some insight, it still leaves courts with a
great deal of flexibility in determining how exactly to distinguish
means from manner.  The line between the two seems to dissolve
when thoroughly investigated and the distinction becomes more a
battle over semantics.  Courts also have yet to determine exactly
what categories of firearms it will allow or by what criteria it will
evaluate categories of firearms.241  Gun control legislation could
categorize permissible conduct by time, age of individuals, manner
in which weapons are carried, weapon capabilities, and geographic
location among other categories.242  Additionally, courts could con-
sider the type of conduct a user intends to engage in with a firearm,
which would further blur the lines as most conduct is hybrid or
unintentional.243  For example, an individual may be of proper age
accompanied by minors and outside of his or her home carrying a
licensed gun with additional features not on the gun originally li-
censed.  This example implicates numerous factors relevant to eval-
uating permissible Second Amendment legislation.
Categorical restrictions bleed into the classification of conduct
with firearms and how that may impact the Second Amendment’s
application.244 Hunters found hunting was not implicated by the
Second Amendment.245  This consideration disregards the particu-
lar firearm used and focuses instead on the context in which it is
used.246  Considering the permissibility of laws restricting the core
right safeguarded by the Second Amendment, it does not seem far-
fetched to predict that higher courts may make the same decision
238. See e.g., supra note 189 and accompanying text (noting remaining lack of
definite level of scrutiny).
239. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., supra note 231 and accompanying text (noting lack of analysis
before claim dismissal).
242. See, e.g., supra note 231 and accompanying text (noting lack of analysis
before claim dismissal).
243. See id.
244. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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in future cases.247  Firearm possession is already limited outside the
confines of an individual’s home and beyond use for self-de-
fense.248  Hunting in the United States occurs for sport rather than
sustenance.249  This distinction may pull hunting outside the origi-
nal intent of the Second Amendment.250  Hunting in the United
States is born of luxury rather than necessity.251  It does not com-
port with Second Amendment origins and precedent to claim that a
sporting and leisure activity requires the same constitutional safe-
guards afforded to basic needs of expression and self-defense.252
Technological advances further muddy the waters of Second
Amendment interpretation.253  Courts have recognized a non-mili-
tary right to bear arms.254  The outer limits to this right remain un-
certain but appear to revolve around self-defense.255  Hunting
firearms have progressed to the point where they are finely tuned
devices suited for hunting rather than self-defense.256  Many fea-
tures standard on a hunting rifle are clearly superfluous on a hand-
gun intended solely for self-defense.257  It remains yet to be
determined if these technological features should remove such fire-
arms from the realm of the Second Amendment’s protection
altogether.258
6. Smart Rifles, Smart Legislation?
The Constitution of the State of New Hampshire incorporates
many aspects of the U.S. Constitution.259  New Hampshire’s pro-
posed hunting regulation states outright that the limitation does
247. See, e.g., supra note 185 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
255. See id.
256. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
257. See id.
258. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
259. See N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. II (establishing natural rights for New Hamp-
shire residents).  “All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights –
among which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this state on
account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin.” Id.
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not violate any rights assured by the New Hampshire
Constitution.260
The proposed regulation clarifies the scope of those impacted
by the proposal, identifying “groups affected”: “[t]his rule affects
hunters and others wishing to take wildlife.”261  In addressing ethi-
cal concerns in hunting the regulation specifically references the
use of “[u]nmanned aerial vehicle[s],” “[s]mart rifle[s],” and
“[l]ive-action game camera[s].”262  Rather than referring strictly to
hunting, the proposal references “[t]ake” and “taking.”263  While
seemingly enabling the regulation to cover a wider scope of activity
and avoid ambiguity, the terminology also reflects the moral issues
underpinning proposal.264  The state is considering banning equip-
ment that is more machine-operated than hunter-operated.265
There is no chase.266  Hunters now resemble gatherers without the
260. See Smart Rifles, 35 N.H. Rulemaking Reg. 1 (Jan. 8, 2015) (commenting
on lack of Second Amendment violation in proposed Regulation).  “The proposed
adoption of Fis 312 does not violate the New Hampshire Constitution.  The pro-
posed does not impose any programs or responsibilities on any political subdivi-
sion of the state nor is any political subdivision involved in the process from an
administrative perspective.” Id.
261. See id.  (defining parties affected by proposed regulation).
262. See id. (defining unarmed aerial vehicle).  An unarmed aerial vehicle is
“any device capable of flying in the air which is remotely, automatically, or other-
wise piloted without an occupant, including, but not limited to, drones.” Id. (de-
fining smart rifle).  A smart rifle is “any firearm that is equipped with a guided
trigger, laser range finder, and/or a ballistics computer.” Id. (defining live action
game camera).  A live-action game camera is
any device capable of recording and transmitting photographic or video
data in real time to a remote device, such as a computer or smart phone.
Live-action game camera shall not include game cameras that merely re-
cord photographic or video data and store such data for later use, as long
as the device cannot transmit data in real time.
Id.; see also Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t at
312.01 (defining live action game camera).
263. See Smart Rifles, 35 N.H. Rulemaking Reg. 1 (Jan. 8, 2015) (defining take
and taking).  Taking
means pursuing, shooting, hunting, killing, capturing, trapping, snaring,
and netting wildlife, and all lesser acts, such as disturbing, harrying, wor-
rying, wounding, or placing, setting, drawing, or using any net or other
device commonly used to take wildlife, whether they result in taking or
not, and includes every attempt to take and every act of assistance to every
other person in taking or attempting to take wildlife, in accordance with
RSA 207:1, XXVII.
Id.; see also Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t at
312.01 (defining take and taking).
264. See Smart Rifles, 35 N.H. Rulemaking Reg. 1 (Jan. 8, 2015) (defining take
and taking); see also Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game
Dep’t at 312.01 (same).
265. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (expressing concern with rapid
advances in hunting technology).
266. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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effort required prior to harvest.267  Considering the standards set by
prior cases, it is unlikely a court would consider the New Hamp-
shire proposed regulation constitutionally invalid.268
V. BULLETPROOF? THE FUTURE OF SECOND
AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION.
As technology advances at a rapid pace, basic constitutional in-
terpretations shift to apply to modern situations.269  Hunting equip-
ment progresses to the point of removing the human element
entirely from the equation, which may justify increased ability on
behalf of the government to regulate the use of such equipment in
coming years.270  This interpretation is particularly relevant as fire-
arms such as smart rifles become more common among hunters.271
Hunters noted a lack of precedent for Second Amendment ex-
tension to recreational hunting, but that may well change as new
cases arise in the light of technology bans in hunting.272  In consid-
ering traditional means of constitutional interpretation, this
Hunters follows relevant precedent and reflects social and political
need firearm restrictions.273  On that note, few issues consistently
polarize the United States as much as gun rights and gun con-
trol.274  The framers initially sought to secure the right to arm one-
self in years immediately following an attack on the nation’s liberty,
focusing on military needs.275  But society’s topical views change,
and Constitutional interpretation shifts with them.276  When the
Constitution fails to explicitly define a right relevant to contempo-
rary needs, such as new technology, courts adapt to fill the gaps.277
Legislation and judicial opinions throughout the years have
shifted further from the Second Amendment’s military roots,
267. See id.
268. See, e.g., Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pennsylvania Game
Comm’n, 28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 345 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (rejecting Second Amendment
protection for hunters).
269. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
270. See id.
271. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (addressing legislative response
to growing popularity of smart rifles).
272. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 345–46 (noting lack of precedent for exten-
sion of Second Amendment to hunters).
273. See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., supra note 18 and accompanying text.
275. See Bellesiles, supra note 66, at 454 (describing political context of Sec-
ond Amendment enactment).
276. See O’Shea, supra note 3, at 598 (noting societal viewpoint’s impact on
judicial interpretation).
277. See id.
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though original context ought not be dismissed entirely consider-
ing the significant protection afforded by the Second Amend-
ment.278  Courts finding it applies to hunting would trigger a
number of new issues.279  Among these would be what, if any, tech-
nology falls outside the offered protection.280  Additionally, courts
would have to determine at what point hunting technology has all
but removed the human element from the sport, and if this would
impact the alleged Second Amendment right.281  Smart rifles all
but ensure kills at the hands of their owners, and owners become
little more than glorified button-pushers.282  As things stand, re-
moving hunters from the equation entirely clarifies the issue and
obviates the need to consider particular technology.283
Additionally, it is important to note that New Hampshire’s pro-
posed ban makes a number of concessions.284  The ban merely pro-
hibits one of countless unfair advantages of man over nature in the
quest to kill for sport.285  The fact remains that the Second Amend-
ment both does not and should not extend to sport hunting.286
Even if it did, hunting with smart rifles—particularly when coupled
with technology such as drones—hardly resembles the core right to
bear arms.287
Numerous questions remain in determining Second Amend-
ment applicability to hunting.288  Lack of controlling authority al-
lows for discrepancies in jurisdictional approaches.289  This
uncertainty enables the courts to consider a number of societal con-
cerns in determining the Second Amendment’s scope of protec-
278. See O’Shea, supra note 3, at 598–601 (detailing Second Amendment’s
historical context).
279. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (noting lack of Second
Amendment analysis prior to claim dismissal).
280. See id.
281. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
282. See id.
283. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (noting rejection of Second
Amendment applicability to hunting).
284. See Smart Rifles, 186 N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. Fish and Game Dep’t
312.03 (2015) (banning certain categories of hunting technology).
285. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
286. See Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pennsylvania Game Comm’n,
28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 340–41 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (rejecting Second Amendment appli-
cation to hunting).
287. See History of Firearms, supra note 92 (providing timeline for critical dates
in history of firearms).
288. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (noting lack of Second
Amendment analysis prior to claim rejection).
289. See Hunters, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 340–41 (noting lack of precedent outlining
Second Amendment application to hunting).
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tion.290  Courts may consider moral implications raised by the use
of certain technology, dangers posed to society, environmental con-
cerns, and the slippery slope that accompanies limiting or ex-
tending constitutional protection.291  The Second Amendment’s
lack of explicit reference to hunting provides the courts with flexi-
bility.292  This flexibility brings with it a great deal of responsibility
in determining how far courts will go in protecting the right to kill
for sport.  Ultimately, the unresolved level of scrutiny, permissibility
of categorical restrictions, distinction between hunting and core
Second Amendment conduct, and advances in hunting technology
show that Second Amendment application misses the mark when it
comes to hunting.
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